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CURRENT GERMAN ATTITUDES AND THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT

~~Report No. 21~~

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SUMMARY

The German war machine is a "going concern" which runs largely on a routine basis. The constituent workers in the three main organization systems of the nation--Defense, Administration, Supply--perform their assigned tasks with a high degree of predictability. Meticulous training, a tradition of social conformity, and an effective distribution of rewards and penalties--all impressed on the popular mind by deliberate morale-building policies and propaganda, are among the chief factors tending to preserve socio-political stability. In such a social system individual attitudes may fluctuate widely without appreciably affecting organizational efficiency.

A survey of current attitudes, by population group and by subject, reveals widespread support of the regime in thought, word and deed, together with a fairly wide-spread undercurrent of grumbling about the hardships of the war, and rare instances of open resistance to authority.

In no case does there appear to be any justification for the view that organizational efficiency has been impaired by the dissident attitudes which are believed to exist at the present time in Germany. Even widespread disaffection of attitude may be expected to influence the trend toward disorganization only after this has been initiated by outside military and economic pressures. Extensive anti-Nazi sentiment in Germany from 1933 on did not prevent the rise of Nazi power.

The relatively normal functioning of German domestic

policies and propaganda concerned with morale provides an indirect check on the above analysis in terms of attitudes actually held by the population. German authorities do not give evidence of reacting to a "morale crisis".

Despite the relative stability of the present German socio-political system it is possible to isolate certain groups in the population which, because of their attitude are likely to prove more susceptible than other groups to anti-Nazi propaganda appeals. Once deterioration of German power sets in, these propaganda "target groups" may then be expected to serve as "catalysts" in hastening the ultimate collapse.

CURRENT GERMAN ATTITUDES AND THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT

I. INTRODUCTION

For all practical purposes, what people say, think and feel about the war is of importance only insofar as it measurably affects what they, or others influenced by them, do about the war. It is the problem of morale analysis to study the relation between feeling and doing, between attitude and effort.

The present report is an attempt to estimate the current attitudes of the German people and the relevance of these attitudes to the effectiveness of the German war effort.

The German nation at war is a "going concern", a highly coordinated organization of many millions of individuals performing a great variety of specialized tasks largely on a routine basis. Routine performance of specialized tasks is assured by long training, by a social tradition which emphasizes the importance of discipline and obedience, by the promise of tangible rewards for the performance and the threat of tangible penalties for the non-performance of assigned tasks.

This routine organizational basis of the German war effort assures a high degree of continuity and predictability of individual states of mind or attitudes. Nevertheless, the example of the German collapse in 1918 suggests that, under certain conditions, even the present highly effective German war machine may be made to cease functioning. The present report is based on the assumption that certain individual attitudes, as expressed in certain kinds

of opinions and behavior, are reliable indicators of potential collapse of organizational discipline.

The plan of the report is threefold. First, it will aim at an estimate of the current attitudes of the German people, using a double approach, by population group and by subject. Second, it will aim to gauge the relevance of these current German attitudes to the organizational efficiency of the German nation, as manifested primarily in the functioning of three key organizations: Army, Civil Administration, and Supply. Third, it will aim to check this evaluation of the situation by inferences from current Nazi domestic morale policy and propaganda.

The current data are derived from the official and unofficial sources listed in the bibliographical note at the end. The inferences and judgments are based on the sum total of background information available, checked, insofar as was practicable, by consultation with qualified observers within the COI and elsewhere.

Since the prevailing German censorship fairly effectively suppresses information about bad morale within the Reich, we cannot perceive so easily as during World War I the internal trends in the enemy country. This fact might give rise to the supposition that conditions may be vastly worse than our knowledge would indicate. It is believed probable, however, that the same factors which prevent our knowing of internal German conditions are also capable of suppressing any subversive activity.

This report is written in the belief that certain groups in the German population can be isolated as being peculiarly

susceptible to anti-Nazi propaganda appeals, even at a time when the German war effort continues unabated. The disaffection of those relatively more "vulnerable" groups, which may be treated as propaganda targets, must be fostered and stimulated by skillful appeals, so that, when the period of military or economic weakening begins, their influence can be expected to make itself felt. Although powerless in themselves, some of these groups will be effective as morale catalysts, infecting other groups with whom they come into contact.

II. CURRENT ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

Current attitudes are surveyed first according to population group, then according to subject. Ideal would be a systematic combination of the two approaches, but lack of information necessitates a less rigorous method.

A. Current Attitudes by Population Group.

An attempt has been made to break up the German population into significant opinion groups. It is recognized that these frequently overlap and are not necessarily uniform in attitude even within themselves. Furthermore, current information on certain of these groups is so incomplete that estimates must be based largely on inferences from the past. Divisions have been made on the basis of age, sex, region, religion, politics, occupation and profession, social class, and education.

There are many gaps in the following survey. These are in part imposed by ignorance, in part by practical considerations. Since the over-all picture of contemporary German society shows few, if any, signs of breakdown, with scattered evidence of complaints

from all classes of society, it would be misleading to exaggerate the importance of these grumblings for the few groups from which they are reported. Germans, as well as other peoples, are, in one sense, always grumbling. The problem is, How much? and, Which groups? The total extent of German grumbling may easily have been greater ten years ago, before Hitler came into power, than today. The practical aim, namely to isolate, if possible, those groups in the population which are relatively more vulnerable to anti-Nazi propaganda, must be the criterion in evaluating the following remarks.

1. Age-Groups. It is believed that significant differences in attitude exist between various age-groups or "generations" in the German population. All observers agree that the younger generation (born 1914 or later; now 28 or younger), educated in the training units created by the Nazi regime, (Jungvolk, Hitler Youth, League of German Girls, Labor Service, Nazi Military Service, Storm Troops, Elite Guards, etc.), are as a whole the most thoroughly pro-Nazi age-group. For the most part they have faith, frequently a blind, unthinking faith, in the future of the Nazi movement, and hope to make their careers by participating in the glorious future of Germany. The postponement of victory has probably dampened but not destroyed their ardor.

Most depressed in state of mind of all the age groups are, on the whole, the older generation (born 1888 or earlier; now 54 or older) who have lived under these regimes and experienced two wars and two revolutions. As with older people in general,

their long experience has made them skeptical, and their flagging vitality makes it harder for them to bear the hardships and strains of the present war.

The intermediate groups (born 1889-1913; now 29-53) are more difficult to characterize. They include both Nazis and anti-Nazis.

2. Sex-Groups. Since war is essentially a masculine matter and the Nazi regime essentially a man's regime, German men, as a group, find themselves better contented with things than German women. Male discontent is, however, expressed over the restriction of activities enforced by the war, and the abandonment of the non-military goals of masculine ambition: professional and business careers, science and literature, travel, hunting, sports, family and social life. These discontents are for the most part of little consequence, however, because the military career has been traditionally glorified in Germany as man's noblest calling, and has been especially so interpreted by the Nazis.

For women, on the other hand, there has been no corresponding expansion of opportunity to compensate for the wartime restrictions. Instead, they have been exposed to two sorts of additional pressure. They have been forced to go out of the home into dull, routine work in war industries, thus sacrificing their families. They have at the same time been urged--at times with brutal frankness by the Schwarze Korps and other Nazi papers--to increase the number of their children despite the absence and possible death of their husbands, despite the difficulties of wartime housekeeping and the insufficiency of domestic help, and despite the uncertain outlook for the future. It is not surprising, therefore, that all reports agree in

describing the attitude of German women as being, in many cases, dour, bitter and despairing. These remarks apply especially to the middle-aged and older groups.

A glance at the accompanying diagram, which shows the age, sex and occupational structure of the German population, throws into prominence the position of the eleven million odd economically dependent women between the ages of 28 and 68. These women, most of whom are married, find their main activities in the household. While no politically important group in themselves, they are in a position to serve as morale catalysts, by influencing the states of mind of the other working members of the family. The shift of a million of them, more or less, into the ranks of the gainfully employed, since September 1939, in no way detracts from the strategic position of these "dependent" women within German society as a whole.

3. Regional Groups. If one considers only groups within the Greater German Reich there would be little disagreement that the Austrians, the South Germans and the Rhinelanders are the most dissident of all the German regional groups.

There are reliable reports of marked disaffection among Austrian troops in Greece after the sinking of many transports bearing Austrian divisions to Crete. One of our Assistant Military Attaches in Athens reports that he found some 400 Austrian soldiers behind barbed wire in an open enclosure on the outskirts of Athens. Two weeks later they were still there.1/ Another report tells of 54 Austrian officers confined in a Salzburg prison for insubordi-

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1/ U.S.M/A, Ankara, No. 7257, July 31, 1942.



"The German Population of 1939, Classified by Age, Sex, Employment and Military Service" (*Wirtschaft v Statistik*, Feb., 1941, p. 46)

nation. Conflict between Austrian and Prussian troops is reported from the Eastern Front.1/ These and other similar reports against the background of traditional anti-Prussian sentiment in Austria, give a fairly clear picture of resentment which occasionally boils over into overt resistance and even rebellion among certain groups within the Austrian population, notably the army and the peasantry.2/ Viennese civilians have developed their own subtle devices for expressing their hatred of the Nazis which remind one more of behavior in an occupied country than in a part of the Reich: biting wit, effrontery and even occasional mass demonstrations. Even many of the original Austrian Nazis have become disillusioned, since the better positions have all been nabbed by the "Germans".3/

Bavarians and Rhinelanders, who, like the Austrians, are mostly Catholic, stand in many ways closer to the Austrian attitude than to the north German. The persistence of such phrases "zu den Preussen kommen" for "enlist in the army", and of derogatory epithets like "Pifke" for "Prussian", indicate a survival of at least some of the old Bavarian attitude. Bavarians are further reported to resent what they regard as Prussian economic penetration in South German cities. There is, however, no evidence of overt behavioral expression of this resentment.

1/ Memorandum for the Naval Aide to the President re Factional Strife in Germany ..., Dec. 2, 1941 (COI No. 6104).

2/ U.S.N/A, Berlin, Nos. 556 and 557, October, 1941.

3/ U.S.M/A, Berlin, No. 18730, October 25, 1941. "I have the impression that life in Vienna now has all the depressing features of life in Berlin, but without the stimulation of faith in the Nazi movement." (Major Wolfinberger).

These remarks must not be interpreted as implying the reality of any secessionist movement among the South Germans. Bavarian nationalism is probably dead, and while many Austrians today may regret their erstwhile enthusiasm for Anschluss and for National Socialism it should not be forgotten that they, like almost all citizens of the new Germany, have gained materially from the change. Despite the displacement of many native Austrian Nazis by carpetbaggers from the Old Reich, Austrian administrative officials have, on the whole, found many new opportunities for jobs and promotions in greater Germany and the occupied territories. Administering the Protectorate has likewise provided a wealth of opportunities for Sudeten German careerists. A possible tangible indication of a general improvement in Austrian and Sudeten conditions (shown in the accompanying graph) is the swing upward in the birth rate which began after their annexation in 1938 and continued until after the outbreak of war in September, 1939.1/ It is worth noting in this connection that 70,709 "marriage loans" on the Nazi model were distributed in Austria between May 1938 and June 1941, or about one for every three births.2/

The only other regional groups on which we have specific information are some of the contingents of German repatriates (Volksdeutsche): Germans from the Baltic, from Bessarabia, from the South Tyrol and elsewhere. Some of these repatriates are

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1/ Wirtschaft u. Statistik, No. 7, 1941, p. 136.

2/ Ibid., No. 15, 1941, p. 299.

pictured as embittered and resentful. Others are satisfied with their newly achieved special status. Still others are biding their time until their future role is decided by the outcome of the war. They are resented in some instances by the native German populations among whom they are arbitrarily planted, although on the whole they have been sent into formerly Polish or Slovak territories as "colonizers". 1/

4. Religious Groups. Neither Protestants nor Catholics as such have any great feeling of loyalty to the National Socialist regime. This has been true ever since 1933. There have been outspoken representations against the Nazis from both groups, notably in recent months from the Catholics. Despite great pressure, the Catholics have not, officially at any rate, endorsed the Russian campaign as a "crusade". Yet neither current evidence nor the traditional role of the Church in German society justifies the inference that active political opposition against the Nazi regime is to be expected from either group. Individual German Lutherans or German Catholics function in their allotted tasks as soldiers, administrators, workmen, and so forth, first as Germans, then as Lutherans or Catholics. Despite the reality of a Church-State conflict in both cases we must not forget that the Lutheran Church recognizes the legitimacy of the prevailing government of Germany,

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1/ Cf. Coordinator of Information Monograph No. 5, and The German New Order in Europe, Ch. IX, U.S. Consul General, Vienna, Summary Report, July 9, 1941.



BIRTH RATES IN THE SUDETENLAND AND IN AUSTRIA, 1930-40

as "die Obrigkeit" and as such to be obeyed; and the Catholic Church, whatever it may say about Nazi policies, has not yet denounced the Nazi regime in as uncertain terms as it has used toward Soviet Russia. There is ground for believing, however, that this difference reveals not so much a distinction in Vatican point of view as an appeasement tactic in the German case dictated by necessity.

5. Political Groups. While there may be remnants of some of the pre-Nazi political groupings there is no evidence whatsoever of any organized political opposition. So-called "underground" work had virtually ceased by 1936. One indirect evidence of the absence of any organized political opposition in Germany is a corresponding absence among the emigre groups. There is no generally recognized German "Government in Exile" and no "Free Germany" movement. There is no evidence of any crystallization of anti-Nazi political sentiment either inside or outside of Germany. As one keen observer, a disillusioned ex-Nazi, has stated:

> "In Germany today there is no electrifying political slogan which is apt to exert any attractive appeal in opposition to the slogan of NSDAP and against the very real achievements of National Socialist politics: yet such an anti-Nazi political slogan would be needed to activate any real revolutionary movement. And just because there is none there is also no real organization of the opposition. If a new idea were to appear, then the fanatics who supported it would be able to develop forms of resistance suited to the new circumstances of the difficult and dangerous terroristic measures of the Nazis. 1/

1/ From an unpublished MS., "Wie denkt das deutsche Volk heute?" May, 1941.

The absence of organized political opposition does not mean the absence of individual differences in political attitude; it simply means the irrelevance of these differences from the standpoint of German stability.

It is likewise true that there are factions beneath the uniform exterior of the NSDAP itself; but Party unity has maintained itself for almost twenty years despite occasional crises and differences of opinion even within the so-called Ruling Party Elite. These differences develop over almost every major issue of policy, but the Führer's decision is accepted as final. Perhaps the most fundamental split in policy, all along, has been between the right and the left wing contingents, between the "Nationalists" and the "Socialists". Thus far, despite tensions, each group has felt, or has been made to feel, that their goals could best be achieved by making concessions to the other extreme. As the war goes on, moreover, there are strong pressures to bury all factional disputes for the sake of achieving unified effort.

Some observers, such as Rauschning, have further noted a gradual "atrophy of ideologies" in the evolution of the Nazi movement, with the rise of purely utilitarian considerations. The kaleidoscope of German war aims is one symptom of this trend. Germany has alternately presented herself in justification for her war effort--often with a cavalier disregard for consistency--as "the champion of the Aryan race", the "young and virile nation of the future", the "organizer of the New Order of Europe", the "guardian of Western Christendom from the threat

of Bolshevism", the "defender of the rights of proletarian nations", the "preserver of the highest values of culture and civilization", and, as always, the protector of the German people. The Party no doubt has its fanatical "believers" and its opportunists, but as long as the regime pays its way it will be hard to discriminate between the two.

6. Occupational and Professional Groups. While little information is available on the attitudes of most occupational and professional groups as such, it is possible at the present time to say something about the armed forces and certain laboring groups.

Army. A Swiss observer, in a report prepared for his own government,[1] has distinguished two elements in the German armed forces: what he calls the "Praetorian Guard" of convinced, loyal and even fanatical Nazis, and the "People's Army", consisting of conscripts and the older professional army officers. The first element is represented most strongly among the younger age groups in the rank and file, and in the younger officials who have been trained in Nazi organizations. Now that a branch of the SS has been placed directly under the Army (so-called Waffen-SS) this may be regarded as the locus par excellence of Nazi mentality in the army.

The rest of the military personnel falls into two sub-groups. First are the older generation of officers, only a few of whom, like Rommel, are old Party members. Second are the older

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1/ COI No. 6158.

troops and non-commissioned officers. The other older officers are not necessarily anti-Nazi, however. Fritsch probably represented the extreme anti-Nazi point of view among the higher officers, and, as is well known, was retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the purge of February 4, 1938. Keitel, List, Leeb, Guderian, Jodl, Runstedt, and the rest are technical military experts for whom independent political activity (such as would be necessarily involved in counter-revolution) is not regarded as a legitimate concern for military men. While some of these men may at one time have hoped for greater power for the Army, the decision has now been reached. They are Germans rather than Nazis, and take orders from Nazi leaders because they regard Hitler's policies as in the best interests of Germany.1/

The recent deaths of Reichenau (who was a pro-Nazi anyway) and the dismissal of Brauchitsch should not be interpreted as signs of a "revolt" by the General Staff from Nazism, although the Brauchitsch dismissal and Hitler's assumption of Supreme Command of the Army probably do indicate a certain amount of tension over the course of the Russian campaign. Brauchitsch was a convenient scapegoat. As to Hitler's power over the army, the soldiers had long since sworn personal allegiance to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces:

> "I swear by God this holy oath, that I shall unconditionally obey Adolf Hitler, Fuhrer of the

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1/ For background see the discussion in H. Rosinski, The German Army (1939).

German Reich and People, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; and that I shall be ready at any time, as a brave soldier, to pledge my life for this oath."

The non-Nazi conscripts, mostly in their thirties, are what the Germans call "more soldiers" (Nursoldaten). The following excerpt from a German soldier's "diary", written in Switzerland during the winter of 1940-41, perhaps expresses adequately their point of view:

"I have been thinking about the meaning of morale among the troops ... A Prussian soldier doesn't know anything about his morale. He does what he is commanded to do. He is so well trained and drilled that he doesn't ever think of doing otherwise. If he does think of something else he rejects the idea immediately as ridiculous and grotesque. Frequently he performs something extraordinary in the course of his duties because he wants to emulate great examples of virtue or because he wants to get some recognition. Crosses of honor are given out in just such sufficiency as to stimulate the vanity of every individual. Propaganda sets for everyone one cause of the war and one war aim. It is put before him in the simplest and most obvious formula and drilled into him, but that doesn't make any difference. Of importance for the activity and thought of the German soldier are only three things: clearly and obviously the severe training and habituation under the threat of harsh punishment in the event of failure; secondly, the prospect of promotion and distinction; and, finally, a more or less unclearly and unconsciously, a vivid sense of patriotism which is not to be disturbed by anything--so what does morale mean?"

It is reported that the continuation of the war is bringing with it a general modification of the attitude of the army. The impact of casualties has undoubtedly been heavier in the Nazi than in the non-Nazi element, since the former were

on the whole younger, better trained and more enthusiastic.1/ The frustrating effect of the unexpectedly difficult Russian campaign has probably dampened the ardor of all the German troops, even the Nazis. The cumulative fatigue of two and a half years of service in the field, with no immediate prospect of peace, may be expected to have a progressively depressing effect on the soldier's attitude. Finally, the drain on manpower means that the criteria of selection and the corresponding quality of troops are steadily lowered--a process common to all wars and all armies. All these processes are tending to make the German army of the spring of 1942 both in composition and in the attitudes of individual soldiers, somewhat different from that of two years ago--how different, only future campaigns can show.2/

Labor. Of various industrial occupation groups we have explicit information on the attitudes of only two: the German coal miners and the Todt trucking service. German coal production, as reported by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and by a "German Economic Expert" interviewed by the U. S. Military Attache at Berlin, has failed to follow increases in other industrial fields.3/ There is some disposition on the part of these sources to attribute this relative retardation in

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1/ J. Edgar Hoover to A. A. Berle, January 21, 1942.

2/ Cf. the three following reports on "Discipline of the German Armed Forces in Greece"; U.S.M/A, Athens, June 27, 1941; and U.S.M/A, Ankara, July 31, 1941, Nos. 7257 and 7258. See also U.S.M/A. Berlin, No. 18711, October 13, 1941, pp. 8-9.

3/ BMEW, Report No. 114, Nov. 24, 1941, par. 21; U.S.M/A, Berlin, No. 18,600, Sept. 1, 1941.

production to discontent among the workers, many of whom are newly imported foreigners. The evidence is too slight, however, to warrant any conclusions about the political attitudes of these miners. It must be remembered that miners are a chronically discontented group, and that low wages, tardy rationalization and other factors are involved in the relatively low productivity of labor in this type of work.

The Todt trucking organization, which transports army supplies from Berlin and other depots to the Russian front, is reported to have fine morale. The men appear to be proud of their highly efficient organization.1/ Other reports on the Todt organization, especially by foreign workers, give a less favorable picture.

Intellectuals. There is one group of professions about whose attitude there is fairly general agreement, the intelligentsia. University teachers, writers, actors, musicians, artists, scientists, and other members of intellectual professions are reported to be on the whole disgruntled with the Nazis and the war. There are among them exceptions who take the Nazi part. The rest, although they earn their bread working for the Nazis, are reported to long for the destruction of Germany's totalitarian regime. The more technical of the professional groups, such as the physicians and the engineers, have adapted themselves more readily to the Nazi regime and the war economy. The record of German intellectuals in the last

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1/ U.S.M/A, No. 18,723, Oct. 20, 1941.

war should be borne in mind in estimating present-day attitudes of this group.

7. Social Classes. Some members of the German aristocracy are reported to be somewhat uneasy over the prospect of their total elimination in the Nazi program of social levelling.1/ There has been a rumor that one prominent aristocratic family with some 250 members in the armed forces has lost sixty-five of these as casualties, the implication being that by some sinister process the Nazis are systematically exterminating those of noble birth. Upper class boys and girls in the labor service have reported considerable animus against them from both leaders and comrades. Sober-minded aristocrats, however, are inclined to congratulate themselves for having lost so little to the National Socialist "rowdies".

The Upper Bourgeoisie are generally regarded as being committed to the German war effort by virtue of their economic interests. The war gains thus far have provided them with hitherto unattainable opportunities for industrial expansion, and the loss of the war now would rob them not merely of present gains and the prospect for future developments, but, they feel, even of their rights and properties within Germany itself. The blockade has, of course, undermined certain types of business, but the war effort has brought all heavy industry to the forefront as "the armory of the Reich". The spectre of Bolshevist victory has brought German business leaders flocking all the more closely

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1/ U.S.N/A, Berlin, October 11, 1941, U.S.N/A, Berlin, October 20, 1941.

around the Nazi banner. Furthermore, the war against Russia has quieted many doubts in this class about Nazi intentions toward private property. On the other hand, irksome restrictions on the erstwhile independence of industrial magnates as well as smaller business men, shortages of industrial power and raw materials, the abolition of profits in the old sense, the unfavorable prospects on the Eastern Front and the entry of the United States into the war have produced pessimism in certain business quarters. 1/

The German Kleinbürgertum, of all social classes once the most solidly behind the Nazi Movement, has lost some of its enthusiasm as a result of the outbreak of the war. The center of public attention has shifted from the street parade, in which the Kleinbürger had his day, to the army and the front. In addition to suffering this relative loss in prestige the Kleinbürger is the focus of many of the more annoying unpleasantnesses of wartime economy centering around shortages of consumer's goods. Business is not good, in fact in some lines has disappeared altogether, and the "glorious achievements" of National Socialism and of the Fatherland are not so glorious as they once appeared. The Kleinbürger has well been called the "forgotten man" of the Nazi Revolution.

The German working classes are reported to resent the presence and the competition of the many foreign laborers in

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1/ U.S.N/A, Berlin, Report No. 565, October 6, 1941; New York Office, MID, No. 209, December 29, 1941.

their midst.1/ There is very slight evidence of dormant Communist tendencies. In rare instances industrial output is said to have lagged because of disaffection among the workers. In consideration of the long tradition of organized labor in Germany there is surprisingly little evidence of anti-Nazi sentiment or of obstructive activity among the working classes, although our sources of information are least adequate for this group and for the peasantry.

The German peasantry have never been ardent Nazis. Today they are perhaps less adversely affected by the war than other social classes. Current evidence indicating their state of mind is almost nil. Certain indirect evidence on the peasant state of mind is, however, available. Wartime price controls are no less irksome to the German than to the American agricultural producer. Most important of all factors influencing the German peasantry are the regulations of the Nazi Erbhofgesetz (Hereditary Homestead Law), which has now been in force for almost a decade. According to this law only one member of a family can own a peasant farm, and even he may be displaced by an outsider if the Party deems him "unfit"; the other members, if they remain on the homestead, are technically only "employees" of their brother or father, entitled to a relatively low wage fixed by law. As one result of this law there has been a steady drain of manpower from the land to the towns and cities, which has interfered with Nazi resettlement policy in

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1/ BEW, Report No. 114, November 24, 1941, par. 23.

the East. While it is as yet too early to discern the net effect of the new law on the varying patterns of German rural economy, there is enough evidence to suggest that here is a "sore point" in the Nazi social system.

The "Non-Aryans" occupy a parish caste position in German society. Their outlook, as far as we can judge, is fatalistic; but many continue to hope for a favorable outcome despite the most relentless persecution. However bad, the position of Jews in the Reich is vastly better than in former Polish territories, where the Ghetto system is rigidly enforced.1/ Thousands of German Jews, however, are being systematically evacuated to Eastern Europe.

Foreign prisoners of war, foreign laborers in Germany and German political prisoners constitute three other caste-like groups in German society about whose attitudes we have next to no current information. It is not difficult, however, to gauge the attitudes of such groups as political prisoners and foreign prisoners of war. Concerning the foreign laborers, many of whom are little better than prisoners of war, there are conflicting reports. For many of them the pay, working conditions and opportunities for special training are superior to anything they have known; and there is some evidence that men of this sort return to their own countries as propagandists for the Nazi idea.

1/ S. Mendelsohn, Jewish Life in the Nazi Ghettos, (pamphlet), Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1942; The Warsaw Ghetto, (pamphlet), Institute of Jewish Affairs, December 1941.

For of the most part, however, these aliens in what is to most of them an enemy country bitterly resent the enforced separation from their families and homelands and look forward to the day of deliverance. This intransigent attitude is especially typical of the Poles, Czechs and Norwegians and applies to many of the Italian "allies" as well.1/

3. Educational Groups. Unfortunately it is impossible on a basis of current information to distinguish significant opinion groups in terms of amount or type of education. It may be significant in this respect, however, that some younger soldiers whose education has been interrupted by the war, appear to be worried by the postponement of their professional training and by the fear that they will be either too old to begin careers by the time the war ends or will face intolerable competition from younger age groups.2/

Summary of Attitudes of Population Groups. Despite wide gaps in our knowledge it is possible to distinguish certain groups in the German population whose basic attitudes make them relatively more vulnerable as propaganda targets for Allied propagandists than others whose attitudes protect them from such appeals. There are, of course, many groups about whose attitudes the evidence is either conflicting or insufficient to justify any generalization.

1/ Cf. U.S.N/A, Rome, August 11, 1941 (commentary on an article in Il Messagero, August 7, 1941, concerning the inspection trip to Germany by Lombrassa, Commissioner for Internal Migration and Colonization).

2/ Buxton Reports, Series 1, No. 202, Nov. 25, 1941.

Vulnerable Groups: Old people, women, Austrians,[1] south Germans, ardent Lutherans or Catholics, party hangers-on, liberal and left-wing political groups, intellectuals, miners, Jews, foreign laborers, prisoners of war, older army conscripts.

Non-Vulnerable Groups: Young people, men, Prussians, non-churchgoers, the ruling elite of the NSDAP, fanatical Nazis, older nationalists, SS-troops, Nazi soldiers.

Others: Middle-aged people, Rhinelanders and other non-Prussian middle or north Germans, nationalistic Lutherans and Catholics, nobility, upper Bourgeoisie, Kleinburgertum, working classes, peasantry.

With regard to all these groups one should remember this simple fact. Pro-Nazi or anti-Nazi, optimist or pessimist, all are wedded to the present German regime by at least the elementary pressures of economic dependency and political coercion. Many in addition are attached to Hitler and the National Socialist faith with a sincere, at times fervent devotion. Furthermore, each passing year has made it more difficult to resist these pressures. Eight years is a long time to maintain an attitude of rejection toward the order of things one has come to accept in terms of everyday routine.

It is a rare individual who will sacrifice his personal security for the sake of an ideal. When, as in the case of Germany today, there is no obvious anti-Nazi ideal for which to

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1/ U.S.M/A, Berlin, No. 18730, Oct. 25, 1941; U.S.N/A, Berlin, No. 557, Oct., 1941.

make sacrifices, it is not surprising that social inertia, not revolution, carries the day. As long as it protects, feeds, clothes, shelters, and cherishes them, it will scarcely be feasible to wean the German people away from their regime.

B. Current German Attitudes by Subject.

The dominant question in the minds of all Germans is, still, Can Germany win the war? In December 1941 a majority of Germans may have answered this question in the negative. The Russian counter-offensive came as a severe shock, Libya appeared to be lost, and the issue in the Pacific still hung in the balance.1/ Today, several months later, the majority of Germans probably feel that the Axis will win. The German retreat in Russia has been accepted as a seasonal expedient, and a successful spring drive is confidently expected; German submarine exploits in the western Atlantic combined with the German navy's dash through the Channel seem to reveal a waning in Anglo-American command of the seas; and, most of all, the fall of Singapore and of the Dutch East Indies appear to assure the Axis of victory in Asia and the Pacific and to offer the possibility of a Japanese-German joining of forces in the Near East. With control of the world's oceans in Axis hands, American power can be bottled up and eventually stifled in the Western Hemisphere. Meanwhile, Russian power will gradually be throttled by pressure from East, South and West. The Allies may be expected to continue the struggle--for many

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1/ Report by "a reliable Scandinavian source" in Berlin, December 25, 1941 (COI No. 12371).

years, perhaps; but they can never win back what they have lost to the Axis. Such is the dominant German view of the future.

On the economic situation most Germans are inclined to take a fairly favorable view. Civilian hardships have by no means proved insupportable, and the prospects of new sources of raw materials in Russia, the Near East and Africa are not, at the moment, too dim. Despite the shortages in consumers goods--food, clothing, fuel, transportation, housing and labor--provisions are adequate even though not abundant.

One of the most irksome phases of the current situation, as the German sees it, is the presence everywhere of droves of foreign workers or prisoners of war, who are being supported by the German people and kept in places of safety while the cream of German manhood is off at the front. To some of the more pessimistically inclined Hitler, who promised to save the German people from destruction, appears to have succeeded only in sending the best Germans off to their deaths while peopling the Fatherland with the scum of Europe.

Most Germans are united in their fear of Communism and of intervention in Central European affairs by any non-German power, whether Russia or England.1/ This fear of alien aggression on German soil gives them strength to support a government which, while feared and hated by many,2/ yet seems to have brought Germany from "the depths of social chaos" to one of the first places

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1/ Mr. Landreth Harrison, State Department.

2/ "National Socialism is feared and hated by the majority of Germans." (U.S.M/A, Berlin, No. 18,695, October 6, 1941).

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among the military powers of the world in less than a decade, and now, for better or for worse, is all that stands between "the German destiny" and the "disaster" which Goebbels and his assistants have been careful to picture as the inevitable corrolary of defeat.

III. GERMAN ATTITUDES AND THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT.

The vital question may now be raised, What is the relevance of these attitudes of the German people to Germany's effective war effort?

In order to answer this question we may consider the German nation at war as a functionally organized social system consisting of three principal sub-systems or key organizations; the Armed Forces, Civil Administration, and Supply. As long as these organizations function, that is, as long as the individuals organized in them perform their assigned duties with appropriate efficiency, the German war machine will continue to work.

Now the efficient functioning of a social system depends on many other factors besides the attitudes of the members: it depends on the presence of adequate man-power, supplies and equipment, knowledge, and leadership or coordination. The attitudes, in turn, are influenced by the adequacy of these other components in the social system and above all by the effective functioning of the social system which is the German war machine. The problem is extremely complex, and evidence extremely limited. Any answer at this stage can be only a hypothesis for further testing.

The following propositions are suggested by way of hypothesis:

As long as group effort is successful, attitudes may fluctuate widely without appreciably affecting total organizational efficiency. Depressed attitudes may be expected to contribute to the disorganization of group effort only after organizational efficiency has already been weakened in some material respect by conflict with a superior opposing force. Once deterioration of group effort has set in, attitudinal depression can hasten the break-down. Ultimate disorganization can take place only after prolonged frustration and general recognition of the hopelessness of continuing the struggle. Disorganization in crucial areas, such as defense, administration or supply, may be of decisive importance.

To answer the original question of the relevance of current German attitudes to the efficiency of Germany's war effort we must therefore, if this hypothesis is correct, first estimate the current level of achievement of the German war machine. Are the German Armed Forces, German Administration and the German Supply System functioning efficiently? Or, conversely, are they encountering repeated or prolonged frustrations in a struggle with a superior power, a struggle which is steadily weakening the material, technological and organizational bases of their war effort? If the latter, has deterioration of organizational efficiency set in? Finally, do the people generally recognize the situation as hopeless?

The present report cannot attempt to answer these

questions (except possibly the last one) on the basis of independent evidence. They are problems for Military, Political and Economic Intelligence. On the basis of estimates made by experts in these fields, however, we may conclude that German organizational efficiency in all three spheres of effort is functioning at a high level of achievement.1/

As noted in Section II, the probable consensus of current German opinion is that Germany will not lose the war, although the outcome, it is thought, may be an encirclement and "neutralization" of the Western Hemisphere rather than outright military conquest. Once Germany controls the Caucasus and the Ukraine, it is believed, her position will be impregnable. Certain groups are undoubtedly more pessimistic than others, but even the extremists have not felt the situation to be so intolerable as to warrant persistent action against the regime, even if this were feasible. Nor is there evidence in the functioning of Army, Administration and the Supply System of deficient performance of assigned duties. The sole reported exceptions, within Greater Germany, are the alleged mutiny of Austrian troops in Greece, the conspiracy of a small group of Austrian officers, and the relatively retarded state of labor productivity in German coal mines. A possible additional case is the reported refusal of certain

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1/ Coordinator of Information, Monograph No. 3, The German Military and Economic Position, December 12, 1941 and supporting studies.

furloughed German soldiers in France to return to the Eastern Front. Reports from Norway and France[1] of the prevalence of "go slow" tactics in German industry have probably been exaggerated from isolated instances.

Our concluding summary on the current state of German attitudes and on the relevance of these attitudes to the German war effort must therefore be:

1. Scattered instances of uncertainty and pessimism in verbally expressed attitudes, concentrated in certain groups, against a background of confidence and optimism;
2. Occasional manifestations of dissident attitudes in the form of deficient or even counter-regime actions;
3. No discernible effect, as yet, on German total war efficiency.

This view finds confirmation in the estimate made by our Naval Attache in Berlin almost a year ago (April 28, 1941). "There are many dissatisfied elements in Germany," he states, "but the German Nazi control is so strong that they are helpless and will remain so until superior force from some other source can neutralize the national control."

Another suggestive confirmation is provided by an independent estimate of German morale made on the basis of intercepts covering the period April-December 1941.[2] "German morale as reflected in intercept evidence does not approach the hypothetical optimum of 100% during this period, but varies safely

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1/ U. S. Consul General, Zurich, December 15, 1941.

2/ COI, Psychology Division Report No. U-1 March 4, 1942.

in the normal effective zone... Although there are depressions in September and again (on the basis of incomplete evidence) in December, morale is at no time dangerously bad."

This summary may be checked in two ways: first, by an examination of (1) current German morale policy, and (2) current German domestic propaganda, on the assumption that the German leaders would be the first to recognize and react to a state of marked dissidence in attitude, especially if it were of such proportions as to affect appreciably the German war effort.

IV. CURRENT GERMAN DOMESTIC MORALE POLICY AND PROPAGANDA.

Have the German policy-makers and propagandists recently been reading in such a way as to indicate that they regard themselves as confronted by a serious crisis in German morale?

On the appeasement side there is evidence of improvements in German social insurance programs during 1941[1] and occasional local improvements in regard to vacations, working conditions and food rationing. On the whole, however, it would appear that the net effect of Nazi policies during recent months has been to worsen rather than improve the lot of the individual German. It may reveal a sensitivity to public uneasiness to have combined announcements of food ration cuts with bulletins of military victories, both during the Balkan campaign and after the fall of Kiev, but nevertheless, the rations were cut, and the public "took it". Similarly, one of the domestic effects

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1/ BMEW, No. 107, October 1941, Appendix 1.

of Goebbel's warm clothing drive may have been to arouse sympathy for the hardships at the front and to provide garments to protect them from the cold, but it had the further effect of depleting the supplies available for civilian use.

On the negative side there is definite evidence of additional police control, which may reveal uneasiness over the possibility of public unrest. Factories are reported to have recently introduced special anti-sabotage watches; German administrations in occupied countries have purged many of the "native" representatives who had at first been allowed on local administrative bodies;1/ police forces in both the Reich and occupied countries are said to have been increased by about 50%, from fear of "civilian disturbances" (replacement of army by police personnel was also a factor)2/ and the SS, also increased in size, has expanded its already partly mechanized military contingent to include an air force.3/ There has, furthermore, been a great increase in the political importance of the SS as contrasted with the SA, which is now in charge of the "refresher" training in the army. While this development is probably connected with an increasing importance of Himmler, the Gestapo and the Waffen-SS as factors in the internal political situation, competent observers feel that it would be wholly inaccurate to

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1/ BMEW, No. 106, Sept. 25, 1941, paragraphs 19 and 20.

2/ U.S.N/A, London, Dec. 3, 1941; G. A. Minto, "Notes on Police and similar Formations in the Reich", J. Royal Artillery, Oct. 1941, 361-366; R. M. W. Kempner, "Hitler's Criminal Code", Free World, Jan. 1942, 395-397.

3/ U.S.M/A No. 18,669, Sept. 25, 1941.

speak with Otto Strasser of another "purge" of the SA like that of June 30, 1934.

In view of the prominence of terror as a factor in Nazi political control, however, it is difficult to justify the view that present developments constitute special "emergency measures" calculated to put down a contemplated counter-revolution. On the whole, therefore, one may say that the Nazis have been continuing their policy of appeasing the public with tidbits of "social legislation", and have maintained, perhaps strengthened, their police efficiency; but that they do not show signs of reacting to a domestic "morale crisis".

There is one further aspect of the present war, in contrast to the last war, which has important implications for morale; namely, population policy. A comparison of the German birth rate (live births per 1000 population) during the first three years of the two wars shows a rather startling contrast. We may take the last month before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and the next to last in 1939 (July) as the basis of comparison:

July 1914, 1915, 1916: 26.6, 17.6, 13.9
July 1939, 1940, 1941: 20.7, 18.5, 19.9 1/

How are we to interpret these figures: The new Nazi consciousness of the population problem and their concrete measures, both direct and indirect, to stimulate births, undoubtedly play some role. More important is the fact that the present war, up until July 1941, at any rate, has been fought in a series of

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1/ Wirtschaft u. Statistik, Oct. 1, 1941, p. 365.

intermittent campaigns, between which soldiers are relatively free to marry and procreate, while during the last war millions of men were kept immobilized for long periods of time on relatively stationary fronts. It is well known that Nazi policy has favored a shifting of manpower between army and industry,[1] which, as one of its effects, may be expected to contribute to the maintenance of a normal birth rate.

Here, as in so many other respects, the Nazis have shown themselves more aware of the potentially deleterious effects of war on the civilian population than their predecessors in 1914-18, and have taken appropriate measures to keep conditions as close to normal as is compatible with the war effort. Even if the Russian campaign proves to be the beginning of a "stationary front" war, from the standpoint of population policy the situation will still, in the third year of war, be more like 1914 than 1917.

B. Domestic Propaganda with Probable Morale Significance[2]

The pressure of events, except in cases of direct personal experiences, affects the Germans only as interpreted by their propagandists and by what little they can pick up from foreign sources of information. The entire domestic information service can thus be construed as serving as a morale-building purpose.

1/ Cf. the discussion of the "double purpose army" in T. Balogh and K. Mandelbaum, "German Manpower Policy", Oxford Bull. Stat., Aug. 30, 1941, 279-281.

2/ For a more extensive discussion of certain phases of this topic, cf. COI, Psychology Division Report No. 5, "The German Radio Propaganda Atmosphere", March 21, 1942.

It is no surprise to those familiar with Nazi Germany to note the careful ways in which the public is trained to interpret world affairs in a manner always favorable to German (i.e., Axis) interests. The withdrawal in Russia was, to the Germans, not a defeat but a "holding operation during the winter season". American entry, widely regarded in the United States as likely to exert a devastating effect on German morale, had already been "discounted" by months, even years, of domestic propaganda: on the one hand the moral prestige of the United States and of American leaders was broken down by a ruthless vilification campaign; on the other hand American military potentialities were written off because of alleged control of the Atlantic and Japanese control in the Pacific.

Shortages of consumers goods are made to appear less grim by the method of "comparative advantage": the brave soldiers at the front, or especially the "poor English", are pictured as far worse off than the Germans at home. The fatal parallel with the last war is counteracted by stressing the relative superiority of the present German position, with respect to military accomplishment, economic planning and political leadership. Uneasy German consciences, troubled by reports of German terrorism and seemingly pointless aggression, are put to sleep by the comforting assurance that Germany has merely been saving these other European peoples from a terrible fate at the hands of British imperialists or

Bolshevist revolutionaries. Doubts over the lengthening of the war are put to flight by the dread spectre of defeat.

There is no doubt that German domestic propaganda has been so organized as to boost morale, both civilian and military. Through the press, the domestic radio, speeches by Party representatives to private organizations as well as to the public, and even handbills the people have been urged in recent months to tighten their belts, to make greater sacrifices and in general to support the war effort until ultimate victory, which is never for a moment doubted. One handbill distributed in Berlin in October countered objections to the law of September 15, requiring Jews above the age of six to wear a Star of David insignia. The following handbill was reported found in Berlin October 14:

"National Socialist German Worker's Party

Gau Direction Berlin

COMRADES! (Fellow Members)

Keep constantly in mind that the nation is fighting the greatest war in its history. We have only one end--GERMANY'S VICTORY--and we must devote all our strength to attaining it.

This victory will be won not only on the battlefield but also in the hearts of the men and women of the whole German nation.

It is the task of the NSDAP to strengthen the hearts of those in the home territory and to fill them with a fanatical desire for sacrifice and victory. This means that you, fellow members, will be faced daily with new obligations. KEEP THIS CONSTANTLY IN MIND!

Attend the meetings regularly and bring other citizens with you.

Tell other citizens what you have heard at the meetings and in this way strengthen their hope.

Fight rumors! They are spread in order to alarm the people and to break their resistance.

The National Socialist Government informs the people of all things that a politically mature nation should rightfully know. When some occurrence or other is not made known immediately, it is only because this would interfere with further developments of our military operations.

When the government is silent you must not talk.

Under no circumstances should you spread rumors.

In your actions and remarks you should serve as an example for your fellow citizens.

You must always be conscious of the fact that the war demands sacrifices in every sense of the word. Prove yourself a sympathetic helper by assisting your fellow countrymen in difficulties. There are enough opportunities for this everywhere, e. g., in your neighborhood, during air attacks, in the streetcar, in business, etc.

Let no one surpass you in your readiness to bring sacrifices and in your faith in ultimate victory.

Never forget that the enemy desires the complete destruction and extermination of the whole German nation.

THE FATE, LIFE, and FUTURE OF OUR PEOPLE ARE AT STAKE! DO YOUR DUTY!".

The Party is reported to have organized a complete system of oral communication for sending instructions to every German. No radios, telephones, or printed material are involved. "It is claimed," writes our Military Attache in Berlin (October 20), "that this system can reach the most isolated German within eight days.". There is evidence that this device is utilized to spread

rumors calculated to boost German morale, such as, for example, the rumor that German-Americans are forced to wear a yellow armband in the United States.

A careful examination of this domestic propaganda conducted through various media, appears to justify the inference that Nazi leaders are busy combatting a wave of complaints, apathy, and even defeatism.1/ Since, however, the quality of emphasis is not too different from similar "pep-talks" delivered in the United States and Great Britain in recent months, it is difficult to argue that the state of public opinion is much more depressed in Germany than in these other countries. The absence of any public channel for criticism in a dictatorship may, however, lead to a more direct translation of attitude into action in forms least readily detectable by the police such as slow or careless work methods. It is significant in this connection that Goebbels has recently acknowledged: "It is not a crime to complain, once in a while." German awareness of the existence of a morale "problem" at this time is further suggested by the increase in morale items and an increasingly "defensive" attitude in German broadcasts directed toward North America.

It has been asserted that German propaganda has "shifted" from an offensive to a defensive emphasis, with the further implication that there has been a corresponding drop in domestic morale.2/

1/ Cf. the series of articles by Goebbels and Mündler in Das Reich during the past six months, and especially his speech at Hamburg, Jan. 13, 1942.

2/ J. Edgar Hoover to Colonel Donovan, Feb. 4, 1942.

While a drop in civilian morale--up to December 1941, at any rate--has been indicated from other sources, competent observers are inclined to doubt the importance of the alleged shift in propaganda emphasis. It should be remembered that the Nazis have always maintained that they were fighting a defensive war, a line very similar to that taken by the Germans during the World War. Bethmann-Hollweg stated to the Reichstag on December 9, 1915, for example: "We are battling in this struggle, which was forced upon us, not to subjugate foreign nations, but to protect our life and freedom. The war remains for the German Government ... a defensive war of the German Nation for its future."

Fortunately for Goebbels and for German morale the general course of the war has thus far made it possible to hearten the German public with such eloquent "propaganda of the act" that mere talk has not had to bear too heavy a burden. The otherwise depressing effect of the Russian campaign has been to a considerable extent overcome by subsequent developments in Libya, the Far East and the Atlantic. These developments are impressive enough in themselves without propagandistic trimmings. Without such factual demonstrations of Axis superiority, however, the German propagandists would undoubtedly face a more difficult task. In the event of gradual Axis defeat the Nazi propaganda apparatus, combined with their effective police system, would probably be able to maintain effective output in terms of economic and military effort for a considerably longer period of time than would be possible in the absence of these controls. At present

the situation appears to be well in hand in as far as effort is concerned, despite the subdued chorus of complaints.

SOURCES

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2. DSI Clipping File of American Newspapers.

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B. Specific Items Not Mentioned in the Text:

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9. N. S. Timasheff, "The Legal Regimentation of Culture in National Socialist Germany", Fordham Law Review, XI, (January 1942), 1-29.

10. U.S. War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces (December 17, 1941)